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1. There is no need to have recourse to sociology and to psychology in order to 
refute many worthy philosophers, in arguing that philosophical ideas, the history of 
philosophy, and philosophy itself, cannot be reduced to a chaotic and impersonal flux 
of problems and ideas. As Nietzsche says: «Little by little I have managed to form an 
idea of what all philosophies up to now have been: they have been the confessions of 
their authors, a kind of autobiographical memoirs, without their wishing it, or being 
aware of this»1. As Nietzsche shows, besides the categories for analysing the sociology 
of knowledge, it is useful to take into consideration too the character factors of the 
individual philosophers, as constants determining not only the actual construction of 
theories but also, and chiefly, their intelligibility.
Obviously, this is the case with the Neapolitan philosopher, Giambattista Vico (1668-
1744). Without making use of a sociology of philosophy, and even more, in this specific 
case, of a «psychology of philosophy», the major innovative significance of Vico’s 
philosophy is obscure and quite undeciferable. Consequently, by reference to these 
analytical categories, I shall attempt to outline Vico’s gnoseology.
William James sets out a character profile of philosophers by referring to two basic 
types, the tender-minded and the tough-minded philosopher2. The first type is 
characterised by what Pascal has described as «un peu d’esprit de finesse», a certain 
distance from things, a certain priority given to reflective reasoning, and thus a certain 
epistemological  optimism. The tough-minded philosopher, on the other hand, defined 
by Pascal as «le philosophe avec un peu d’esprit de géométrie», gives a degree of 
priority to facts over reason, a certain epistemological pessimism, and an element of 
empiricism, sensism  and materialism.
Carl Gustav Jung adopted and developed James’s character profile, identifying two 
basic psychological types: the introverted and the extroverted3. The first type gives a 
special place to reality, to which it then adjusts its own subjective, mental conditions. 
The second type favours, always and unvaryingly, its own subjective, mental conditions. 
These two basic psychological types are in turn integrated with the four main functions 
1 F. Nietzsche, «Beyond good and evil», in Opere complete, Milan, ed. G. Colli and M. Montanari, 1965; vol. 6, part. 2, para. 6 
(my emphasis).
2 Cf. W. James, Pragmatism. A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking, New York, 1907.
3 Cf. C. G. Jung, Psychologische Typen, Zurich, 1920.
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of the human psyche – thought, emotion, sensation and intuition. Combining the two 
basic typological categories with the above four functions, we thus obtain eight types 
of «philosophical character».
                       Tender-minded                                      Tough-minded
                     introverted                                    introverted
thought                                            thought
                         extroverted                                           extroverted
                         introverted                                            introverted 
emotion                                                    emotion
                         extroverted                                           extroverted
                         introverted                                            introverted
sensation                                                  sensation
                         extroverted                                           extroverted
                         introverted                                            introverted 
intuition                                                    intuition
                         extroverted                                           extroverted 
Clearly, this is not the occasion to make an exhaustive case-study of the proposed 
typologies. At all events, as regards Vico, we must refer to the left-hand column, which 
stresses reflective reasoning. Indeed, the basic characteristic of Vico’s philosophy is 
that of the possibility of reading and interpreting the world and ourselves. From this 
statement of principle, I have tried to proceed to particular classifications. From the 
standpoint of thought, Vico is more introverted than extroverted. In fact, he sets out 
from a specific «intellectual construct», what Schumpeter would call an «original 
vision», to which he consequently tries to apply the external world, facts, and objective 
ideas. From the standpoint of feeling, on the other hand, he is more extroverted than 
introverted. In fact he attributes his own evaluation to contact with the external world 
(history), giving no weigh to their own inner worth. However, as regards sensation Vico 
can strictly be described neither as introverted nor extrovert, and he is indeed neither 
a theoretical, nor a practical, realist. Finally, as for intuition, Vico is both introverted 
and extroverted. With the «intuitive introverts», Vico admits the objectivity of facts, 
12     aCademiCus - international sCientiFiC Journal
but with the «intuitive introverts» he gives greater weight to the contents of the 
unconscious, especially the contents of the collective unconscious. From a character 
point of view, therefore, Vico is a tender-minded intuitive, introverted at the rational 
level, and extroverted at the level of sentiment.
2. Giambattista Vico is thus a «many-faced Janus» who can lead us into error from 
whatever angle we view him. That is, whatever reading of Vico’s philosophy is adopted 
runs the risk of being taken for the only true one, not realising that this is only one 
possible reading among others. Indeed, Vico can appear to be anti-cartesian, anti-
sensationalist, anti-enlightenment, both idealist and anti-idealist, positivist and anti-
positivist, an existentialist, an anti-materialist, an anti-mechanist, a conventionalist, 
an essentialist, an instrumentalist, etc., although, with the possible exception of the 
anti-cartesian reading, these labels cannot escape criticism for long. The difficulty in 
providing a comprehensive and exhaustive reading of Vico’s philosophy derives directly 
from the complexity of his character and this, we shall see, considerably complicates 
the degree of intelligibility of «his» philosophy.
For example, Benedetto Croce declared himself a follower of Vico and «read» Vico 
idealistically. Yet if we just quote the formula of verum ipsum factum, which is 
generally the synthetic expression of Vico’s criterion of truth, we realise that ultimately 
Vico’s idealism is not very plausible. Indeed, whereas the idealist generally states 
that knowledge of something is the knowledge of the model of production of that 
something. In addition, the impossibility of an idealistic reading of Vico emerges in 
the demonstration of the theoretical value of common sense. Vico argues that what 
a nation, or «all mankind» thinks in common, must thereby have some foundation 
of truth. Therefore the basis and foundation of «our» truth (or certainty) is «civil 
consensus», from which a reading of the verum/factum directed towards a sociological 
gnoseology can be derived.
Another example of the uncertain intelligibility of Vico’s philosophy is provided by the 
observation that while Enzo Paci gave an existentialist interpretation of Vico4, Roberto 
Ardigò believed that Vico’s criterion of truth anticipated the positivistic criterion5 and, 
I would add, of the neopositivistic criterion, as one associates the verum/factum with 
Wittgenstein’s protocol requirements.
One can see a further aspect of the unclear understanding of Vico’s philosophy in the 
different configurations he took on in the post-Hegelian period. «Keine Metaphysik 
mehr!», «No more metaphysics!» cried the Young Hegelians, fascinated by historical 
materialism, physicalism, and sociology. In this «Keine Metaphysik mehr!», Vico 
appears twice, first at Hegel’s side as theorist of art, language, myth, religion, morality, 
4 Cf. E. Paci, Ingens Sylva, Milan, 1949.
5 R. Ardigò, «Il vero», in Opere filosofiche, vol. 5, Padua, 1891, p. 540 ff.
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law, politics, and historiography. The other side of Vico is that of precursor of Comte, 
Spencer, and sociology.
A similar argument, which also shows an imperfect understanding of Vico’s 
philosophy, is that which refers to science. Until 1714, Vico was keenly interested in 
problems of physics and biology. Therefore, it is probable that he was well informed 
about contemporary science. Nonetheless, there is a tradition which says that in 
Liber physicus (since lost), Vico expressed a position related to Platonic vitalism (the 
Timaeus). This supports the anti-cartesianism of Vico, his relentless polemic against 
«Signor Delle Carte», but without considering, however, that the antimaterialism and 
anti-mechanism he is supposed to profess are outdated for their time, and thus hard 
for the well-informed Vico to have maintained.
There is one aspect, however, in which Vico’s intelligibility seems, apparently, 
uncontested: the anti-cartesian stand. Vico was certainly not a Cartesian. Basically, 
this was because Vico, as against Descartes, refused to base the criterion of truth on 
that of evidence, as well as not setting great store by the great heuristic importance 
of mathematisation (axiomatisation). Croce said, in this context, and this time with 
some basis of accuracy: «Only one systematic, profound thinker represented the 
opposition to abstraction and Cartesianism, the Italian Giambattista Vico, who […] saw 
thought as an ideal history of reality, immanent in the real history which runs through 
time. He eliminated the distinctions which made the concept a separate order, and 
replaced that by levels and instances, which he […] called ‘ideal time’. He saw the 
epoch as abstract and mathematical, which could be seen rising up as a coming era 
of philosophical decadence, predicting the results of Descartes anti-historicism (and 
this prophecy was to come about)»6. Here, Croce is incontestable, but it is possible to 
emphasize that Vico was anti-cartesian in a profoundly Cartesian sense. That is, Vico 
criticized the Cartesian Cogito because he believed it inadequate for the construction 
of science, which was not metahistorical, nor private and individualistic, though to 
Vico, the cogito is immediate presence and pure observation (from this, a critique of 
existentialism can also be drawn).
These remarks just cite examples, possibly not very conclusive ones, of the «difficult 
intelligibility» of Vico. As we have seen, this may be related to some extent to his 
character. Reference to character profile, however, though it points us in a new and 
possibly fruitful direction as regards the answer to an old, complicated question, does 
not shed full light on Vico’s obscurity. Reference of this kind, in fact, demonstrates that 
Vico is «obscure» but does not tell us why.
Through the years, Vico’s philosophy has seemed peculiarly difficult, given that it has 
also been interpreted now from one extreme, now from the other, because he never 
6 B. Croce, Logica come scienza del concetto puro, Bari, Laterza, 1905, 9th edn., 1964, p. 311.
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clarified his initial theoretical premises. If Vico is anti-sensationalist, anti-idealist, 
anti-enlightenment, anti-cartesian, etc., … he can also be seen as anti-everything, as 
basically he is «anti-Western», «anti-dichotomic». In the field of Western philosophy, 
Vico can be anything he wants, for the simple reason that he tried to articulate his 
thought outside Western philosophy, outside the classical Western dichotomies – 
sensation and reason, fact and value, theory and practise, etc. …
Nec tecum nec sine te, seems to be Vico’s message to Western thought, and this is the 
real significance of his anti-cartesian critique.
3. Broadly speaking, Vico’s problematic is: how, when, and why, did «civility», 
or civilisation, begin? On the other hand, strictly speaking, Vico’s problem lay in 
«discovering» the «nature of things human», by means of a «rigorous analysis of 
human thought about human needs or utility in societal life», and for whom «this 
Science is a history of human ideas, in which it seems we must follow a metaphysics 
of the human mind»7. Vico thus is concerned with the natures, and not the nature, of 
things human. The difference is significant. The distance from the Western tradition 
is established here with great precision – a tradition which had never doubted the 
nature of things human, - either sensation or reason, either matter or spirit, either 
practise or theory, etc. Hence, to discover these natures, Vico proposes a «rigorous 
analysis» of the motives for which, by necessity or by utility, mankind had arrived at a 
«societal life».
As we see, Vico’s interest lay not in the «nature of man», but the «natures of 
things human», and not the «human mind». Marx was later to speak of «man in 
his singularity». Vico was interested in the «mind of men», the «generic being» as 
it manifested itself (took form) in «societal being», as Karl Popper would say, in the 
«construction of the structures of the world». This enterprise too belongs outside the 
formulae of Western Thought, which basically stresses the singular nature of human 
knowledge, as scientific-geometric knowledge of the object, which reaches its highest 
point first with Descartes and later in Kant’s Critique of pure reason.
However, Vico’s standpoint is different. He makes a clear division between the 
«natural order» and the «social order», and later preferred to speak of the «sciences 
of nature» and the «sciences of the intellect» and/or «sciences of culture». Vico says: 
«Philosophers, until now, having examined divine providence only for the natural 
order, have portrayed only a part of it […] but they did not examine the part closest to 
man, whose nature has this chief characteristic: to be social»8.
7 G. Vico, Principii di Scienza nuova, Milan and Naples, ed. F. Nicolini, Riccardo Ricciardi Editore, 1953; vol. 43, # 347. Cf. too the 
3 volume edition (Turin, Einaudi, 1976) which reproduces the whole of volume 43 of the complete works, p. 124 (my emphasis).
8 Ibid., # 2, p. 3.
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The new science, therefore, «should be a reasoned, civil theology of divine providence»9 
a «history of the ideas, customs and acts of mankind»10 (this history was later to be 
called Kulturgeschichte by Riehl, Freytag and Burckhardt). The new science «seems to 
have been lacking till now, either because the philosophers have simply not known 
of it […] or have only examined it in order of natural phenomena, so that they call 
metaphysics ‘natural theology’, wherein they study this aspect of God, and support it 
by means of the physical order observed in the movement of bodies, such as spheres, 
or the elements, and in the ultimate cause above the other lesser natural phenomena 
observed»11.
Following these analyses, we arrive at the original meaning of Vico’s polemic against 
Descartes. We can see relatively clearly that the critique of Descartes’ «reason» (the 
instrument of demonstrative truth) is the same as that of the critique of the «natural 
order», or the critique of mathematisation as the sole criterion of knowledge (this is 
where the «critique» becomes a criticism of the dichotomies of Western Thought). 
Rather than in the «natural order» and its logic, - experimental method – Vico is 
concerned with the «social order» and its logic, which differs from that of the natural 
order because the latter derives from (Cartesian) reason, and the former, according to 
Vico, from intuition. Kant later put it: «I was led to think that the examples of mathematics 
and physics […] were sufficiently noteworthy, as to reflect on the essential point of the 
alteration of method […] and to reproduce it here»12. This explains relatively easily 
why Vico can be considered both a positivist (priority of the experimental method), 
and an anti-positivist (primacy of intuition over reason).
The theoretical completion of the «rigorous analysis of human thoughts», according 
to Vico, must be sought in a «metaphysics of the human mind». As we shall see, in this 
context Vico’s philosophy becomes a proper gnoseology. However, this gnoseology 
is wholly disconnected from expressions like «I know» (the Cartesian cogito), and 
is, rather, linked to «a history of ideas, customs and actions of mankind». This is a 
gnoseology which develops a «logic history» or better, a phenomenology of ‘refined’ 
thought. Marx was later to elaborate beautifully on Vico’s brilliant insight: «Man, 
however, is not only a natural being, but rather a human natural being […] because 
he is a generic being. Therefore […] neither objective nature nor subjective nature 
is immediately present as equivalent to the human being. And just as everything in 
nature has to be born, so too man has his birth, history […] History is the real natural 
history of man»13.
9 Ibid., # 342, p. 122.
10 Ibid., # 368, p. 133. 
11 Ibid., # 342, p. 122.
12 I. Kant, Critica della ragion pura, Bari, Laterza, 1966, p. 20. Kant adds a note, «This method, imitated by the physicist, consiste 
of […] seeking the elements of pure reason by means of what can be confirmed or contradicted by experimental means» (p. 21).
13 K. Marx, «Critica della dialettica e della filosofia hegeliana in generale», in Opere filosofiche giovanili, Rome, Editori Riuniti, 
1971, pp. 268-269. 
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This is essentially Vico’s problem, that of producing a «sociological gnoseology» based 
not on a scientific-geometrical knowledge of the object, but on the historical evolution 
of evidence of human, social actions. In other words, this is not only, and not mainly, 
a gnoseology of the «natural being» but also, and mainly, one of the «generic being», 
of the human species, and not of the individual, as Descartes and Western philosophy 
in general believed.
At this point, the non-Western nature of Vico’s philosophy becomes clear, and with it 
its problematic intelligibility. In the history of Western philosophy, we find evidence 
of similar elements in Kant, who is undoubtedly the finest and most acute observer 
of the Western mind. Thus, in November 1784 (and note: in 1769 Kant said he had 
«complete clarification», and in 1781 the Critique of pure reason was published), 
Kant wrote a short article in Berlinische Monatsschrift, called «Ideas for a universal 
history from a cosmopolitical viewpoint», whose second point was: «In man, who is 
the sole rational creature on earth, natural dispositions, intended for the use of his 
reason, are only completely developed in the species, not the individual»14. Kant would 
say that (Cartesian) reason is not enough to explain the enormous complexity of the 
human mind. One must hypothesise something else, as for example a single human 
knowledge, a knowledge of the «generic being»15.
Vico himself confirms this reading of his philosophy. In the second volume of Principi 
di scienza nuova Vico rewrites classical gnoseology. We have in #363, «Throughout 
this book we shall show that whatever the poets first understood within popular 
knowledge, the philosophers later reconstituted within wisdom; thus the former can 
explain the senses, and the latter the intellect of the human race»16.
In this quotation the movement in knowledge from the singular (the cogito) to the 
plural  («generic being», «species») comes out clearly. In classical philosophy the 
senses and the intellect are, taken separately, two basic categories of interpretation. 
On these, clearly, the whole Western theory of knowledge is based. For the most part, 
till Kant, this can be seen as either «the theory (of the primacy) of the senses» or as 
«the theory (of the primacy) of reason». As evidence of this, there is no need even 
to mention the major distinction which separates Western theories of knowledge – 
rationalism and empiricism. It is sufficient to illustrate this by referring to the truth 
criterion, to the Thomist formula veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus, whose history 
most clearly shows the uniformity (Popper would say the unimportance of Western 
philosophies.
14 I. Kant, «Idee di una storia universale da un punto di vista cosmopolitico», in Scritti politici, Turin, UTET, 1965, p. 125.
15 This controversial  (and largely overlooked) point in Western philosophy has recently been discussed by György Markus, 
Antropologia marxista, with my introduction, Naples, Liguori, 1979.
16 G. Vico, op. cit., # 363, p. 130.
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4. However, Vico’s point of view is different, The function performed by the senses 
in classical gnoseologies is now undertaken by poets, in the «history of human 
ideas». On the other hand, the function performed by reason is now undertaken by 
philosophers. Certainly, the meaning of this rewriting of traditional gnoseologt is by 
no means clear, but the basic intention of this extract is obvious. It confirms as true, 
from the standpoint of the «species», what «Aristotle has said of the particular case 
of each individual»17.
A further example of the radical, and unnoticed, change in Vico’s perspective is 
clear if we consider the importance  the philosophy of authority (in the context of 
the species) takes on (the Cartesian Foucault calls this the «microphysics of power»). 
This «philosophy» is the first by-product of «the main aspects of the Science». Vico 
says, in this context: «Thus there begins a new philosophy of authority, which is the 
other chief aspect of this Science, taking the term ‘authority’ in its original meaning of 
‘propriety’ […] wherein there are ‘actors’, in common Roman justice those who have 
‘reason to command’»18.
Just as in Vico’s gnoseology the truth and the phenomenon coincide (verum et factum 
convertuntur), in the same way in the reading of his gnoseology, originality and 
difficulty complement each other. This, we have seen, is partly to be attributed to 
Vico’s character, and partly to the «systemic complexity» (Luhmann) of the critique of 
Western dichotomies.
At any rate, the controversy about Vico’s philosophy centres on a kind of «intellectual 
confusion» from which he never managed to escape. In the history of Western 
philosophy, there is a «case» similar to Vico: Kant, with the difference, however, that 
where Kant tried to systematise the dichotomy of Western thought (sensation and 
reason), he demonstrated an unparalleled intellectual rigour, but where he tried to 
transcend traditional dichotomies, he only produced the above-mentioned argument 
on «Ideas for a universal history from a cosmopolitical standpoint». By contrast, Vico 
went much further.
Reference to Kant is useful for another set of reflections. Suppose that Kant had not 
written the Critique of pure reason, but only the Critique of judgement, in which here 
and there he included a critique of pure reason. Clearly, in that event, the major 
difficulty would be that of reconstructing Kant’s gnoseology. In fact, this is Vico’s case. He 
«intuited» a new methodology of knowledge, and, without bothering to clarify it from 
the logical-methodological standpoint (this is Vico’s «negligence»), he immediately 
applied it to the domain of historical knowledge. Croce, in a moment of lucidity often 
lacking in his reading of Vico, though in all honesty the expression ‘logic of history’ 
17 G. Vico, op. cit., # 363, p. 130, my emphasis. Vico of corse is referring to the famous phrase nihil est in intellectu quod prius 
non fuerit in sensu.
18 Ibid., # 386, p. 145. 
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is his, accurately grasped Vico’s «intellectual confusion» (based on character). Croce 
said: «[…] one should not confuse people by offering everything at once. This, indeed, 
was the approach of the supreme Giambattista Vico, who included in one book every 
book, the whole book in every chapter, and often in one page or sentence his whole 
philosophy and historiography; I, though proud to be called a follower of Vico, see in 
that didactic process not a model, but a warning»19.
The formula verum ipsum factum, contains a new criterion of scientific knowledge 
based, as Kant was to say, «on the species, not the individual». However, Vico himself 
saw this formula unilaterally, in the «historiographic» sense. To continue the above 
elaboration, Vico’s historiography is like Kant’s aesthetics, a «realm of application» 
of general principles, a modest «two plus two», without pretensions of arriving at 
the difficulty of larger calculation. For example, Vico formulated the elements, the 
axioms, the principles, the corollaries of the new science, and also speculated that, for 
example, religion, marriage and burial were the three principles of the «beginning of 
the civilized world». Yet from what «mental categories», and what structures of the 
«new science» were these principles derived? Was Vico’s «new science» a rational 
reconstruction of Western civilisation, or was the «new science» the methodology of 
the rational reconstruction of  «human ideas»?
It is hard to find in Vico a comprehensive answer to these questions.. Only once did 
Vico speak of the «new science», rather discouragingly, as «uncertain, shapeless, and 
obscure»20. However, on one point Vico’s philosophy is quite clear, when it postulates 
an absolute «anti-philosophism» (indeed, we should put it as «an Absolute […]». From 
this point of view, it is impossible to see any basis for an idealistic reading of Vico. 
Although, as we have seen, all other readings of Vico are to some degree possible, the 
idealistic one is anti-Vico, not only on account of the verum/factum, but even more 
so for the «Absolute» lack of any primacy for the Idea, whose function would be that 
of subsuming historical continuity. In addition, when the opportunity occurred, Vico 
much enjoyed making fun of the metaphysical profundity of «idealisms». In section 92, 
dealing with archetypal ideas, Vico wrote: «This began with an over-inflated principle 
– water – perhaps because it was observed that water made pumpkins swell»21. When 
dealing with essences and substances, Vico wrote, no doubt referring to Descartes: 
«Certainly, Roman heroes felt ‘being’, very grossly, in ‘eating’ itself, which must have 
been the first meaning of ‘sum’, and later meant the first and the second; even today, 
our peasants, referring to the fact that a sick person is still alive, say that ‘he’s still 
eating’. For ‘sum’ in the sense of  ‘being’ is highly abstract, and transcends all beings: it 
is very fluid, in penetrating all beings, very pure, in that it is circumscribed by no being. 
19 B. Croce, op. cit., p. 103.
20 G. Vico, op. cit., # 41, p. 31.
21 Ibid., # 92, p. 56. 
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They felt the ‘substance’, which means ‘what is beneath and supports’, in their heels, 
as it is on the soles of his feet that man exists»22.
An example of the correctness of the interpretation of the above can be found in 
paragraphs 1131-1138, where Vico advises the reader about the best way to «make use 
of this Science»23. As regards theoretical understanding, Vico suggests «shedding all 
corpulence and everything deriving from that which affects our pure mind»24, meaning 
we should shed the «Cartesian metaphysickings», or the dichotomies which recur 
throughout Western thought. From the methodical point of view, Vico tells the reader 
that the «new Science» «reasons by means of a strict geometric method, whereby it 
passes from the true to the immediately true, and thus draws its conclusions. Hence, 
you must have acquired the habit of geometrical reasoning, and must thus not open 
these books at random to read them or skim through them, but learn the lesson from 
top to bottom. You must watch that the premises be true and well ordered, and not 
be surprised if almost all the conclusions are amazing […]; for results are disturbed by 
fantasy, whilst the premises conformed to pure abstract reason»25.
Further, from the point of view of the simple intelligibility of his study, given that the 
«new science» «presupposes […] great and diversified learning, even erudition»26, it 
is essential to «read» the «science» with «a comprehensive mind, as there is nothing 
reasoned from this science in which innumerably other elements are not involved, 
which permit conceptualisation, partly from each one and from all together in this 
whole: in this alone the whole beauty of a perfect science lies»27. Thus, because the 
«new Science» «contains all discoveries mainly of different kinds, and many wholly 
contrary to the belief which, as regards the things analysed, has up to now prevailed»28, 
a «great acuteness of mind»29 is required. And since «it explains wholly new ideas 
in their essence»30 it is advisable that the reader read «this volume at least three 
times»31.
5. As Kant was to propose in the first section of the Critique of pure reason, so Vico 
too expounds a «doctrine of elements», «of principles», and of «method» of «generic 
reason», which, «like blood for the living body, has to flow within and bring to life 
everything this Science reasons about the common nature of nations»32.
22 Ibid., # 693, p. 323.
23 Ibid., # 1131, p. 509.
24 Ibid., # 1132, p. 509.
25 Ibid., # 1133, p. 509-510.
26 Ibid., # 1134, p. 510.
27 Ibid., # 1135, p. 510. 
28 Ibid., # 1136, p. 510. 
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., # 1137, p. 510.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., # 119, p. 71.
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Vico singles out two basic properties of the human mind. The first involves a radical 
criticism of the Protagorean principle, defined by Adorno as the «backbone of Western 
thought», which is «man is the measure of all things, those that are, for what they are, 
of those that are not, for what they are not». Thus, Vico argues «Man, through the 
indefinite nature of the human mind, where this falls into ignorance, makes himself 
the rule of the universe»33. Kant in turn began the Critique of pure reason, in 1781: 
«Human reason […] has the particular destiny of being troubled by problems it cannot 
avoid, because they are posed by the nature of reason itself, but to which this cannot 
find the solution, as they go beyond any power of human reason»34.
According to Vico, the second property of the human mind is that of analogy. «It is 
another property of the human mind, that where men can form no idea of things 
distant and unknown, they make an estimate of them from things known to them, 
and existing»35. Like the first, this property is also seen by Vico in a negative light. 
Basically, Vico wants to criticise not so much the scire per causas, for, as we have 
seen, in some respects Vico upholds the experimental method, as the «metaphysics 
of scire per causas». Vico’s assumption about this line of analysis are surprisingly, 
opposed to Newton’s deterministic mechanism, and anticipate, more philosophico, 
Einsteinian and quantum relativism. The negative reading of the two properties of 
the human mind is confirmed by these extracts from the Principles of a new science: 
«Those ignorant of the natural causes which produce phenomena, where these cannot 
even be explained by similar eventualities, attribute to phenomena their own nature, 
just as the populace says […] the magnet loves iron»36. The second extract is more 
important as it has a methodological significance, arguing that the two properties of 
the human mind «provide the bases for rejecting everything which has been proposed 
till now regarding the principles of humanity, based on the unlikeliness, ridiculous 
contradictions, and impossibility of such views»37.
Six axioms are derived from the two properties. The first states: «Philosophy, to be 
of use to mankind, must raise and put right fallen, weak man, not betray his nature 
nor abandon him to his corruption»38. That is, philosophy should provide methods 
of explanation and understanding of a universe explored only with difficulty, and not 
«interpretation» of it, in which Western philosophy is already rich.
The second axiom (Vico’s «merit») involves the difference between speculative and 
practical thought. Whereas «philosophy considers man as he should be»39, «legislation 
33 Ibid., # 120, p. 71. Elsewhere, Vico says « […] (there is) […] a property of the human mind undefined, by reason of which, 
concerning things it does not know, it often believes, in a shapeless manner.more than what they actually are», # 48, p. 36.
34 I. Kant, op. cit., p. 5.
35 G. Vico, op. cit., #122, p. 71.
36 Ibid., #180, p. 84.
37 Ibid., #163, p. 80.
38 Ibid., #129, p. 73.
39 Ibid., #131, p. 73.
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considers man as he is»40. This second axiom demonstrates to a greater degree the 
view that Vico’s philosophy is basically a gnoseology, even if of a particular kind, even 
sui generic. Indeed, he anticipates a  «science of ideal truth» and a «science of real 
certainty». The first science provides the lines of analysis, the categories, whence it 
is possible to «navigate» in «ideal, eternal history», and «discover» the rule which 
determines «refined history», or the history of mankind. Vico calls this science 
philosophy but it is better to say the «logic of history». The «science of real certainty» 
is intended to «discover» the certainty of phenomena as they occurred, and Vico calls 
this philology.
The third axiom is: «Things outside their natural state do not adapt and do not 
endure»41. In a corollary, he adds, «mankind, from the earliest times, has lived and 
lives tolerably in society»42. This showed, necessarily, that «Vico’s problem» was not so 
much, as he himself believed, that of «whether there is a law in nature and if human 
nature in sociable»43, but rather if this observation (living «tolerably in society») could 
take on, and thus establish, an epistemological significance.
The fourth axiom states: «Men who do not know the truth of things strive to reach 
certainty, because, though not able to satisfy intellect with science, at least will rests 
on knowledge»44. Thus, the faculty which determines scientific knowledge is intellect, 
and thereby it is possible to classify a judgement as true or false. Where one cannot 
speak in term of truth (or non-truth) Vico suggests it is best to «strive for the certain». 
Then, the problem is, how to determine what is certain? Vico answers, that it is the 
special «science we have termed philology»: that is it is determined empirically. 
Indeed, «philosophy studies reason, when the science of the true derives: philology 
is concerned with the authority of the human will, whence knowledge of the certain 
is derived»45. There is thus a «science of the true» and a «knowledge of the certain». 
The «science of the true» is closer to God than man, and here Vico cannot but be a 
man of his time. The «knowledge of the certain», however, is our «science».
Before pursuing this important branch of Vico’s gnoseology, an introductory 
observation is useful. My reservations expressed above regarding Vico’s «intellectual 
disorderliness» are completely well-founded, Starting from the distinction between 
«true» and «certain», Vico unexpectedly changes the basic argument. No longer is 
there discussion of «elements of the abstract mind», but of the «theory and practise 
of historiography». The critic, then, can only reconsider under its real heading what 
Vico places under the other.
40 Ibid., #132, p. 73.
41 Ibid., #134, p. 74.
42 Ibid., #135, p. 74, my emphasis.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., #137, p. 74.
45 Ibid., #138, p. 74.
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Thus, «Human will, by nature wholly insecure, decides and determines by means of the 
common sense of men, within human necessity or utility, which are the two sources of 
natural law of species»46. That is, our scientific knowledge rests on very fluid bases (as 
Karl Popper has argued), which are held constant as far as is possible, by common sense, 
which is the origin of our scientific knowledge (as the «later» Wittgenstein argues). 
«Common sense», says Vico, «is a judgement based on no reflection, as normally 
perceived by a whole order, a people, a nation or all mankind»47. «Uniform ideas within 
whole people unknown to each other must have a common criterion of truth»48. That 
is, as Carnap would say, concepts of observation are themselves a scientific domain, 
though limited in time and space, as well as being, obviously, at a very low level of 
generality. Just as Carnap proposed moving from observational concepts to those of 
quantity and measurement, so Vico postulates a logical system to raise common sense 
to a very high level of generality. «Hence the mental dictionary (certainly a Carnap 
term) is born […] from which eternal, ideal history is conceived»49.
From this it is clear that there are well-founded reasons for reading Vico’s philosophy 
in a logical sense, and it is surprising that a scholar as consistent as Ernst Cassirer 
should have felt it necessarily to quote Vico only twice in the four volumes of Das 
Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Neuren Zeit.
Vico continues, however: «There must, in the nature of things, human be a mental 
language common to all nations, which uniformly grasps the substance of feasible 
things in social life, and explains this with as many different modifications as correspond 
to the various appearances it can assume»50. Weyl certainty put it no better – and it 
cannot better be expressed – in formulating the concept of «the empty schema of 
possible sciences»51 a century later. Alfred Taski added significant elements in arguing 
that logic should be seen «as the name of a discipline which analyses the meaning of 
concepts common to all the sciences, and which establishes the general laws which 
govern concepts»52.
We can express the sixth axiom thus: verum et factum convertuntur, or verum ipsum 
factum. «The nature of things in simply their birth at specific times and in specific 
forms, which are always so, and thus as such, and not otherwise, are things born»53. 
In some ways, this is the Baconian experimental method. However, in other ways, this 
is the criterion of truth as praxis, and in others still, the criterion of the «composite 
46 Ibid., #141, p. 75.
47 Ibid., #142, p. 75.
48 Ibid., #144, p. 75.
49 Ibid., #145, p. 75, my emphasis.
50 Ibid., #161, p. 80.
51 Cf. H. Weyl, «Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft», in Handbuch der Philosophie, Berlin, 1927. 
52 A. Tarski, Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Science, New York, 1941, revised 1946, 10th printing 
1963, p. XIII, (Italian edn. Milan, Bompiani, 1978, p. 10).
53 Vico, op. cit., # 147, p. 76.
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pluralistic formation», of truth, which, borrowing from a Thomist tradition, comes into 
its own with Hegel, with some post-Hegelian systems (Marxism and sociology) and 
with relativist and quantum physics54.
As we shall see below, Vico’s truth criterion provides the «foundations of the certain», 
whilst taken together the six axiom give us the «foundations of the true», in that 
they permit the construction of scientific propositions. Both properties and axioms 
are «general propositions, and establish this Science definitively»55. Along with the 
fore mentioned two properties, Vico identifies three further properties which, taken 
together, regulate «societal life» and set the «limits of human reason»56.
The first of these properties is curiosity. Vico says: «Curiosity, the congenital property 
of man, daughter of ignorance, and which gives birth to science, opening our mind to 
wonder, provides this custom: wherever it sees an extraordinary effect in nature […] 
it immediately asks what that can mean or signify»57. This means, to quote Galileo, 
«The cause is that which, when present, leads to the effect. Now, a ball of lead sinks: 
in the form of a basin, it does not: I ask the reason why it doesn’t»58. From this, I 
believe incontrovertibility, we see the correctness of the reading of the verum/factum 
as triumph of the experimental method.
The second, additional property, is derived from the first original one, and can be put 
together from these two paragraphs: «The original authors of mankind were involved 
with an important issue in which they combined the – as I were – concrete properties, 
qualities or relations, and formed from these their poetic orders» …«So that one can 
say this first epoch on earth was truly concerned with the first operation of the human 
mind»59. Following the phase in which the «issue» involved a kind of inventory of 
«sensible things» (phenomena), a second phase occurred (criticism), by way of which 
we attain the exactness of the being and becoming of things. In this second phase, in 
addition, the possibility exists of achieving real science. This is more accurately the 
third property (of the additional series). «In human minds», states Vico, first the issue 
appears, then the critique «as first there is knowledge, then judgement of things. The 
issue is what makes minds ingenious, just as criticism makes them precise»60.
6. I have already dwelt on how it is possible to read Vico’s verum/factum following 
three different paths of analysis. We have just seen that the first method concerns the 
experimental method, and this is so obvious there seems no point in returning to it. 
From this it follows that the idealist reading of Vico’s philosophy loses all foundation 
54 For the elaboration of these analyses, cf. Markus, op. cit..
55 Vico, op. cit., # 164, p. 81.
56 Ibid., # 360, p. 128.
57 Ibid., # 189, p. 85.
58 G. Galilei, Opere, vol. 3, Florence, 1890-1903, p. 27.
59 G. Vico, op. cit., #495-6, p. 205, my emphasis.
60 Ibid., # 498, p. 205.
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and fails (to simplify: whereas idealists have no doubts about the ideal nature of truth, 
which is only to be contemplated, Vico expounds a position wholly opposed: what is 
true is what is known and what one can do).
What, on the other hand, defines the other two possible readings of Vico’s criterion 
is a particular «trend» which, from Hegel on, has developed a latere of traditional 
Western thought: relativism. As is well-known, Marx relativises the Hegelian Man 
and State, while Planck, Heisenberg and Einstein relativised Newton’s deterministic 
mechanism. This «trend» in Western thought is still not epistemologically clear, even 
though it has produced real states of things, such as the socialist states, and quantum 
and relativist physics. Now, the «new» criterion of scientific knowledge devised by 
Vico clearly anticipates this trend, which usually is seen as originating with Hegel and 
the critique of Hegel. This tendency argues, in this connection, that there is not one, 
single «realization» of the idea, a single «authentification of the idea» but many «true 
aspects» of the same idea.
Hence, unlike Croce who did so believe, even when proclaiming himself a follower of 
Vico, we no longer have a Truth, but we do have a more modest «truth» confined to its 
own domain of application, and which therefore is not called truth, but, for example, 
exactness (as regards scientific knowledge). That is, the term «truth» no longer has a 
univocal meaning, related to the unique, but many meanings, a plurality of meanings 
corresponding to the number of scientific domains (into which this «divine term» 
(Vico) falls).
There are two paragraphs in the Principles of the new Science which support quite 
incontrovertibly this reading of Vico’s truth criterion. «The truth of the laws is a kind 
of light and splendour illuminated by natural reason, whereby jurists are often used 
to say verum est as synonym for aequum est»61. That is, in the scientific realm of 
jurisprudence truth corresponds to justice, and here the proposition «this is just», even 
though «jurists» using a linguistic expression taken from common sense, continue to 
say «it is true» instead of «it is just».
The second paragraph, by way of illustration, is more coherent, and as usual we have 
to consider the quotation both in terms of the scientific  realm to which Vico was 
connected, and its meaning in a more general, and indeed gnoseological, framework. 
Vico states that the definition just examined (#324) is a «particular proposition», 
intended to show «in the particular material of the natural law of peoples» (this 
is the particular scientific domain to which Vico addresses his own gnoseological 
insights  something general, which serves in a logical-methodological sense «to draw 
conclusions in all matters involved here»62.
61 Ibid., # 324, p. 113.
62 Ibid., # 325, p. 113-4.
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We find a further example of this in paragraphs 400 and 401, where Vico lays the 
foundations of «poetic logic». He distinguishes logic from metaphysics for the reason 
that whereas metaphysics «contemplates thing for all the orders of their being»63, 
logic is involved with expounding their meanings. Consequently, the difference 
between logic and metaphysics lies in the semantic function which logic develops, 
whilst metaphysics does not (is this not, in essence, neopositivism’s criterion of 
verification?).
«Logic», says Vico, «[…] first and foremost meant ‘fable’, transposes into Italian as 
‘speech’ (favola-favella), whence ‘idea’ and ‘word’ […] As […] verbum to the Jews 
meant also ‘fact’, and to the Greeks also ‘thing’»64. Logic thus is a metric structure of 
semantic operations through which we arrive at the «knowledge of the certain», or 
the «realisation» of the true. In short, through logic we arrive at the formalisation 
of the states of nature, for which we are now able to create «science» or different 
«sciences» (this is Tarski).
It seems fitting, at this point, as regards this rather unusual interpretation of Vico’s 
criterion of truth, to quote Vico himself: «One can on no account call into question, 
that the civil world was certainly made by men, whereby they can, because they must, 
discover its principles within the modifications of our own human mind itself»65. This 
seems to be the deep significance of Vico’s philosophy, and the reason why I came to 
consider it an important stepping stone toward a theory of «creative empathy»66.  
63 Ibid., # 400, p. 152.
64 Ibid., # 401, p. 152-3.
65 Ibid., # 321, p. 113, my emphasis.
66 Cf. F. Ferrarotti, «Materiali per una teoria dell’empatia creatrice», in La Critica sociologica, XLII, n. 165, Primavera 2008, pp. 
13-41.
